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BETWEEN ACTIVE OPPOSITION, DIALOGUE AND LOYALTY:
CHURCHES IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 1970-1989/90
by Katharina Kunter
Katharina Kunter, Ph.D. is Associate Professor for Modern and Contemporary
History at the University of Bochum and member of the Ger ma n Research
Foundation Project "Transformation of Religion in the Modern Age". Her main
publications are Five Hundred Years Protestantism (2011), Broken Dreams and Fulfilled
Hopes: Protestant Churches in Germany in Suspense between Democracy and Socialism
1980-1993 (2006), and Churches in the Helsinki-Process (2000).
The aim of this paper, beyond the case study itself, is to draw out the underlying structures
and mechanisms with which the Protestant churches in the German Democratic Republic had to
deal in the last period of Communism. By so doing, I hope to contribute to and further stimulate
international and balanced comparisons of the situations of the churches in Central and Eastern
Europe in the Cold War.
The paper will provide an overview of:
•
the general situation in the GDR in the 1980s
•
church policy in the 1970s and 1980s
•
arising state-church conflicts or tensions
•
the new role of the church in 1989/1990
…at these three different levels:
•
how the state acted against the churches
•
how the churches responded to these attacks, and finally
•
what have been the short- and long-term effects for the churches of this confrontation.
General Overview
When we survey the situation in Ea s t Germany during the Cold War we find at the
beginning of the decade of the1980s an increasingly deteriorating economic situation. The GDR’s
growing indebtedness to the West, the restriction of its imports and widely felt shortages of food
and other goods made for a desolate economic situation. Demoralization and resignation
dominated the emotional tone of the country, drawing a large part of the population into a sort of
“collective depression.” One consequence of this was the increasing number of people who sought
to leave the GDR and relocate in the Federal Republic of Germany (FDR) despite the risk that they
themselves and their families would likely be labelled as criminals and be discriminated against
by the state. Between 1962 and 1983 10,000 relocations into the FRG were registered annually, but
from 1984 to 1988 the rate increased to 40,000 per year.1 This persistent grey shade of the eighties
was sensitively described by the East German writer Christa Wolf in her novel Kassandra: “Gerade
die Gewöhnung an den Zustand war es, die mir die Hoffnung nahm” (“It was this getting used to
the normality of it all that took away my hope”).2 The situation got worse in other ways too. The
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Klaus Schroeder, Der SED-Staat. Partei, Staat und Gesellschaft 1949-1990 (München, 2000), p. 276.
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State Secret Service (Staatssicherheit or “Stasi”), intensified its presence, expanding its personnel to
as many as 91,000 by 1989.3
Church Policy 1970s and 1980s
At t he same time a new phase of state-church policy was emerging in the GDR. The
seventies were characterized by a sort of détente between state and church. On 6th March 1978,
toward the end of that decade, there was a summit meeting (“Spitzengespräch”) of prominent state
and Protestant church leaders who agreed upon a modus vivendi and form of “peaceful coexistence.”
Parallel to this, the state began to express a growing interest in the international and ecumenical
contacts of the GDR Protestant churches and sought to use the East German theologians and pastors
involved with international ecumenical bodies as tools for the s pr ea ding of its of its own
propaganda and intelligence services.4 They often succeeded in this (but not always, as Christa
Grengel shows in her paper in this issue).
As this high-level a church-state modus vivendi was being established, the number and
volume of critical voices was rising t oo, mostly from groups closely connected to Protestant
churches and parishes. They were speaking out against the growing militarization of GDR society,
and joined their voices with others in Europe protesting the NATO “Double-Track” decision of
December 1979, and calling for a nuclear free Europe and international disarmament. Many of these
groups gathered together under the protective “umbrella” of the Protestant church, forming the
basis of an “independent peace movement.”5 These church bodies and church-related groups were
the only alternative to the state-run, ideologically-based peace movement of the GDR. They
challenged it through movements like t he “Berliner Appell – Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen” (Berlin
Appeal - Make Peace without Arms) organized by youth pastor Rainer Eppelmann and the Berlinbased dissident Robert Havemann. Another was the popular movement “Schwerterzu Pflugscharen“
(Swords into ploughshares). A broad-based GDR net w ork “Frieden konkret” (Concrete Peace),
founded in 1983, added to this new social dynamic.6
The state and the Party responded aggressively to this open challenge from a growing
network of independent peace groups, launching a counter-offensive of repression, persecution,
arrests, censorship, spying, and expulsion of “offenders” to the FRG. This posed a dilemma for the
Protestant churches and their leaders. Many of these opposition groups were being protected by
the churches (or were operating under the official church “ umbrella”), but this was highly
controversial and sometimes heatedly debated within the church. The Protestant church had long
remained aloof from politics and the idea of being seen as supporting the political opposition was
for many very upsetting. Most church leaders, especially on the highest levels of the main
Protestant church body, the “Bund Evangelischer Kirchen in der DDR” (Council of Churches in the
GDR), wanted to avoid the provoking the state. They tended to avoid such controversial topics as
individual civil and human rights, and sought to restrain opposition groups and initiatives.
In turn the Communist party (SED) also intervened actively, seeking to gain the leadership
of t he Council of Churches as an ally and a stabilizing factor in society.7 To a degree they
3

See Dietrich Starlitz, Geschichte der DDR, (Frankfurt, 1996), p. 332.
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See Ehrhart Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989, (Bonn, 1997), as well as Anke Silomon,
„Schwerter zu Pflugscharen“ und die DDR: Die Friedensarbeit der evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR im Rahmen der
Friedensdekaden 1980-1982, (Göttingen, 1999).
6
For more detail see Ehrhart Neubert.
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See Clemens Vollnhals (ed.), Die Kirchenpolitik von SED und Staatssicherheit. Eine Zwischenbilanz, (Berlin, 1992).
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succeeded. The synod of the Council, at it s meet ing in Görlitz in September 1987, refused to
support a petition, “Absage an Praxis und Prinzip der Abgrenzung ” (Renounce the practice and
principle of borders) brought by a grassroots group that broached the question of the lack of basic
liberal human rights in GDR.8 Still, the fact that members of the synod were debating the petition
and discussing the issue was taken by the petitioners to be a success. It showed that the GDR
regime was not omnipotent and that some space did remain for free speech within the sphere of
the churches.
Again, the response of ¨the SED was one of growing repression towards the end of the
eighties. In November 1987, two months after the Görlitz synod, a Stasi squad broke into the parish
rooms of the Zionskirche in East Berlin and arrested many activists gathered there. East Berlin
opposition groups had created there an “Umweltbibliothek” (Environmental Library), where they
collected and displayed officially banned literature. They also printed and distributed underground
publications, organized events with debates on banned topics and coordinated a dis s idents’
network. The brutality of the Stasi in making these arrests was shocking and Protestant Christians
organized solidarity demonstrations all around the country.9
Another important incident happened in January 1988 at theannual state-sponsored “Rosa
Luxemburg/Karl Liebknecht”demonstration. For the first time, dissidents from Protestant groups
openly participated, carrying placards with two quotations from Rosa Luxemburg: “Die Freiheit ist
immer die Freiheit des anderen“ and “Der einzige Weg zur Wiedergeburt – breiteste Demokratie“ (Freedom
is always the freedom of the other; and Widespread democracy--The only way to rebirth). This was
even more remarkable since just before that demonstration some 160 persons had been arrested,
but the opposition refused to back away or hide: Christians gathered for worship and intercession;
information-sharing activities were launched; opposition groups were connected and coordinated;
and all across the GDR Christians expressed their solidarity. Still, however, there were tensions
between Pr ot es t a nt activists and the churches’ official statements. As a whole, the churches
advocated caution, political reserve, but they engaged nevertheless in actions of solidarity with
individual victims of repression.
Church-State-Conflict and Tensions
Now the SED s eemed to be losing its grip on power and again the state answered by
putting pressure on the church leadership.10 Bishop Werner Leich, leader of the most influential
church leader s hip body in the GDR “Konferenz der Kirchenleitungen” (Church Leadership
Conference), was summoned in February 1 9 88 t o a meeting with Politbüro member Werner
Jarowinski. Jarowinski said the church had overstepped its bounds and had been used by groups
whose members were enemies of the state. The time had come to “go back to being church.” More
state repression was forthcoming. Church magazines were censored, worshippers were stopped
and inspected by police and pastors and other church workers wer e placed under still more
constant surveillance. But the churches refused the state’s demand that they dissolve the groups.
Again, church and state were obliged to meet at the highest level. Bishop Leich was summoned
in March 1988 to an encounter with the GDR’s highest ranking politician, Erich Honecker, the
“Staatsratsvorsitzender” (Chairman of the State Council). Leich sought an understanding with
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See Anke Silomon, Synode und SED-Staat. Die Synode des Bundes der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR in Görlitz
vom 18.-22.September 1987, (Göttingen 1997).
9
more detail in Neubert, (footnote 5 above).
10
See Detlef Pollack, „Kirchliche Eigenständigkeit in Staat und Gesellschaft,“ in Claudia Lepp/ Kurt Nowak
(eds.), Evangelische Kirche im geteilten Deutschland (1945-1989/90), (Göttingen, 2001), p. 202.
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Honecker, pointing out that the growing social problems in GDR could only be solved if the church
were included in the dialogue as mediator and advocate between state and society.
New Roles, 1988-1989
In the role of “advocate for the silent majority” the Protestant church found a new purpose
and self-understanding. It brought the Church back to the “heart of society”(Detlef Pollack), where
it not only defended its own institutional autonomy but also the people’s interests. This new role
had been evolving through the “conciliar process for justice, peace and the integrity of creation”
set in motion by the World Council at Churches at its 1983 Assembly in Vancouver, Canada. In the
GDR it led to three ecumenical gatherings related to the “conciliar process” held in 1988-1989 that
built a new kind of ecclesiastical-political forum in the GDR. Active Christians were now more
often present and better integrated in networks than in previous years. Certain Protestant parishes
with very active groups engaged for peace, human rights and democracy in GDR were isolated
islands of opposition, however, with influence across the regions.
As this was happening the state’s SED regime was going through an ever deepening crisis
of legitimacy as its public support waned noticeably. Citizens suffered from ever deeper economic
difficulties. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s promising reform programme of “Perestroika” and
“Glasnost” seemed to be reaching everywhere but the GDR. The GDR’s fraudulent national
elections of May 1989, and Egon Krenz’s (Erich Honecker’s successor’s), public support in June
1989 of the massacre of Chinese student protesters in Tiananmen Square in Beijing contributed to
a further weakening of the SED’s authority. The numbers of people wanting to leave the GDR for
the FRG increased dramatically. Refugees occupied the West German embassies in Prague and
Warsaw, and with the opening of Hungary’s western border in September 1989 some 50,000 GDR
citizens had sought refuge in the West by the end of October.
In the fall of 1989 from the former opposition group activists formed new democratic
cir cles a nd a civil rights platform, and began calling for free elections. The internal political
dynamic changed.11 The SEDwas now faced with a political opponent who had clear demands and
programmes that found broad support among foreign observers, but most especially among the
mass of “ordinary East Germans.” The most important of the new civil right movements were
“Neues Forum” (New Forum), “Demokratie Jetzt” (Democracy Now) and “Demokratischer Aufbruch”
(Democratic Awakening). In October the new Social Democratic Party of the GDR was founded.
In all of these Protestant Christians were active, stepping out from the walls of the church and onto
the wider political stage. Democratisation and taking power now became the two main goals. A
central round-table was established in Berlin at the end of 1989, followed by the creation of regional
round-tables a r ound the country. At these forums different political and State officials came
together – from the Communist party as well as from the civil rights movement – to fill the power
vacuum and plan the first free elections in March 1990 of the GDR parliament, the “Volkskammer”.
Because of their training and experience in public speaking in the parishes and in church and
ecumenical councils, and their reputation as persons of high moral integrity, Church leaders were
called on to moderate these round tables.
Churches and Christians were very visible at the end of the GDR regime in other places,
too. For the first time the synod of the Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR took a clear and
11
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radical position calling for the dis solution of the one-party-system, democratic elections, the
freedom to travel, and other civil rights. The churches also played a major role at the local level.
Many churches opened their doors wide in autumn 1989, praying for a peaceful transition, holding
candle-light vigils, organizing special worship services, and generally encouraging a feeling of
solidarity and belonging together. The pea ce prayers, candle-light vigils, and Monday
demonstrations at the Nicolaikirche in Leipzig gained much media attention in the West, but it was
not alone. Protestant churches all over the country gave the uprising of autumn 1989 their own
public face. That the “Wende” (The historical Turnabout) of 1989 finally occurred as a “peaceful
revolution,” a transition from dictatorship to democracy without bloodshed or destruction, was
thanks in no small part to what t he churches had accomplished. When the Berlin Wall was
breached on the night of 9 November 1989 political developments accelerated and the way to the
German reunification was opened. But that story exceeds the current topic.
Conclusion
Looking back now in an attempt to summarize, we see how the State and Party sought to
weaken the churches and b ring them to heel: its acts of repression, its attempts to turn their
international cooperation to the State’s advantage, t he promotion of “peaceful coexistence,”
fostering a “modus vivendi,” obliging clergy to serve the State’s propaganda ends, aggressive
counter-offensives to church initiatives, persecution, arrests, censorship, spying, expulsion – all in
an attempt to keep “the church in line”.
We see the churches also reacting to the State offensives: promoting deténte between State
and Church, enabling opposition through alternative thoughts and actions, sheltering opposition
groups and providing an “umbrella”under which they could have more or less free discussion. But
whatever method they chose there was no action without reaction from the State; no reaction
w it hout counter-reaction. The setting was the totalitarian state. In the short term there was
polarization; opposition arose within the churches and their institutions, sometimes coming close
to the splitting of Protestantism. In the long term the authority of church hierarchy was weakened,
the church became less state-orientated, and secularism was fostered.12
That Protestantism and its churches stood on the side of the people, as it did in autumn of
1989 showed at a very special moment in history a growing acceptance of a new identity for the
Church: first and foremost as advocate and actor in the civil society and not – as so often in the past
– the natural counterpart and ally of the State. The 21st century will show where and how far this
new experience will take Protestantism in Germany.

12
See also, although not focused primarily on the churches Detlef Pollack / Jan Wielgohs (eds.), Dissident and
Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe. Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transitions, (Wiltshire, 2004).
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